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I. Introduction
Recently, there has been considerable debate in the government,
business and academic communities regarding the value, accuracy, frequency
and necessity of government crop forecasts. This debate has intensified due
to several developments. The first is the recent trend toward slowing the
growth in non-defense public sector expenditures. As the federal budget has
been stretched tighter, some information activities have been curtailed.
These cutbacks have coincided with a second, not necessarily uncorrelated,
development; the increased sophistication of private information collection
activities. Private firms now partially duplicate government efforts to
disseminate information on, and predictions of, crop forecasts. Just and
Rausser (1981) have shown that these private forecasts can match and, in
many cases, even dominate the government's forecasts. Several recent
incidents in which errors in government forecasts have had perverse effects
on market prices have also had a bearing on the debate.—^
The discussion involves several interesting questions. Does the
existence of private information agencies reduce or negate the value of
public information? Should the government continue to collect information
that private agencies collect? Should the government concentrate its
efforts on large or small markets? Should it release its information more
or less frequently, or earlier or later in the crop year? How should the
market properly respond to announcements, that are known to be error-prone?
How can we determine if announcements are worthwhile? All these questions
have been discussed in various forums. However, this discussion has been
hampered by the lack of a general theoretical framework. This paper
introduces such a framework which is then utilized to derive answers to
these and other related questions. Our analysis differs from earlier
studies in that it explicitly allows for the market to collect and process
information that is unavailable to the government information agency.
Our discussion is organized along the following outline. In the next
section we model a futures market equilibrium and show how that equilibrium
reflects information provided by the government sector. Section III
contains a discussion of how the model might be extended to analyze the
social welfare derived from government announcements. We discuss several
concrete implications of the theory in Sections IV and V. The discussion in
Section IV is focussed on questions which pertain to the optimal strategy
for the collection and dissemination of information by the government while
Section V considers issues that arise in empirically measuring the impacts
of government announcements. Our main conclusions are summarized in Section
VI.
II. Market Equilibrium
In this section, we establish a model of future's price determination
in a market with ah uncertain future supply of a representative commodity.
We utilize this model to illustrate how government supply forecasts affect
market price, given that the market utilizes government information optimal
ly. To begin we assume that the true supply becomes known to the market on
day H (harvest day) where H is known with certainty. The true supply is
denoted as S . In any period t < H, individuals can purchase or sell claims
to part of the expected harvest through a futures market that clears daily.
Let denote the total amount of the future harvest claimed through day t
where t ^ H. We assume that the stock demand at t has the simple linear
form
"t '
where Y and 0 are positive parameters that are independent of t, denotes
the futures market price at t for delivery at H and u^ is a daily
2 2/
shock which has a mean of zero and variance of O .—
u
demand
On day H this market will clear with S„ = D and the price will be P„.
n n . H
For t < H, Sjj is a random variable and we assume that the market clears on
'-M '-M .days prior to H such that where S^is the market participants
expectation of conditioned on information available to them through day
t.
The arrival of information on the value of from some arbitrarily
chosen day 0 through day H can be summarized by a sequence of random
ables , •••» where we define as the market's forecast
revision on day t according to
van-
e" = gM _ t = 1, H. (2)
Assuming that market participants use information efficiently it follows
that E( e^) = 0 and, if i j , E(e^e^) = 0. Let . denote the variance of
1 ' * 1 j M, 1
M
e.. It follows that
1
(3)
" t+1 ^
That is, the current forecast error (S„ - S^) can be expressed as the sum of
rl t
subsequent forecast revisions. Since we are assuming that markets use
information efficiently, these subsequent revisions depend only upon infor
mation not yet revealed to the market. In the remainder of the paper we
will frequently refer to the simply as "new information provided to the
Mmarket." Notice that the market's forecast error variance, V^, falls
M I 2
monotonically at t approaches H since = A •
. . . .
Having already stated that is the market-clearing condition on
day t, it follows from (1) and (3) that the market-clearing price for day t
must be
Thus the price in every period t is a function of market forecast errors and
the true supply. It follows from (4) that P , -P =—+ -^(u , -u ).
t+1 t p t+1 p t+1 t
In other words, daily changes in the futures price result entirely from new
information in the marketplace.
The Effect of Goverment Predictions on the Current Equilibrium Price
We can now introduce the government into the market. The government is
assumed not to be an active trader in the market we are analyzing. However,
it does collect information about S . The government announces this infor-
H
mation to the market either directly or through forecasts of based on
this information. For the time being, we assume that the government conveys
information entirely through its forecasts of S . We are concerned with how
these forecasts influence the equilibrium path of prices, P^i Our previous
discussion has already given us a large part of the answer. To the extent
that government announcements affect the equilibrium price path it must only
be through the new information conveyed to the market, i.e., the unantici
pated component of the announcement.
Like the private sector, the government receives new information about
S from day 0 through day H. The arrival of this information to the govern-
H
ment can be viewed as a sequence of independently distributed random vari
es G G Gi ^ T,/ G. „ „ , G.2 2 j r,/ G G.
ables e_, e , e , e ), where E(e.) = 0, Var(e.) = a ,, and E(e.E.)
U 1 rl~"in 1 1
== 0 for i ^ j. Over a given time interval [0, H] it is unlikely that the
M M r G Gsets (e., ..., e I and |g , ..., e | will be equal if we assume that the
U n U H
private sector and public sector draw their e's from partially non-overlap-
3/ .
ping sources.— Even if the government revealed its e's as they were being
M,
drawn, unless the government could somehow deduce the e s as they too were
4/being drawn, the two sets will generally be unequal.— Notice that our con
structions imply that the true value of S is revealed to both the govern-
ment and the market by the end of day H.
As we noted earlier, we assume that, periodically, the government
Gissues forecasts of based upon some of the e 's it has drawn. As we
showed in the preceding section, these forecasts will elicit a market
response only if they add to what the market already has learned about the
Q
value of S„. In particular, let S . be an announced government forecast of
H t+ i
Su made on day t+1 that efficiently reflects all of the relevant information
n
available to the government by that day, i.e.,
-J/i•
Notice that will only cause a price movement if it differs from the
market's existing forecast of Sj^. According to (3) and (5), a necessary and
M C ^ M G
sufficient condition for S . * § ' . is that i (~t +i t+i ^^2 ^ ^
To pursue this argument, consider how the market revises its prediction
^ Q
of S following a government announcement in period t+1, S . Assuming
H ^
that the market will weight its original prediction and the government's
prediction in a way that will minimize the forecast error variance of the
revised market prediction, that new prediction can be written
^ ^
for some value of the real number a such that 0 ^ 1. If the market is
rational (i.e., minimizing its forecast error variance), then the new fore
cast error variance, V^., = Var( - S„), must be less than or equal to
t+1 t+1 H
and they will only be equal if a= 0 (i.e., Che market ignores
The formula for for a given a, can be written
M
where, for expositional ease, we are assuming that the covariance of and
e? is equal to zero.—'' Differentiating with respect to a yields the
first order condition for the market's optimal choice of a,
The market will increase its weight on government forecasts, the larger is
the market forecast variance relative to the sum of market and government
forecast variances. The intuition underlying this result is that as market
information tends to be noisier than government information, the market is
more likely to discount its own forecasts vrtien they differ from the govern
ment's forecasts. Notice that a will be set to zero (meaning that the
H 2
market places no value on government information) only if ^ a , « 0 or if
t+2
H 2
y a .-xo. The first case amounts to saying that the market has determined
t+2
with certainty prior to the government's announcement. The second case
implies that government announcements are so noisy that no useful informa
tion can be extracted from them. For all intermediate cases, government
announcements will serve to lower market forecast error. Even if
2 2
• I so that government forecasts tend to be noisier than market
o, L M,i
forecasts, the market will still in general assign a positive weight to
government forecasts, i.e., a> 0.
Given the market's revised forecast of S in response to the government
prediction, the market's price on the day of the announcement, will
be, according to (4), a function of the market's revised harvest forecast.
Specifically,
Vi = ^ ^ Tt+1 • (9)
which shows that the market price level on day t+1 will be a function of the
Mmarket's anticipated government announcement (S. " S„ - 5 e.) and the
^ t+2 "•
• • 1 • ft 5,M M Gn ^unanticipated portion of the announcement = Z ' ~ )•
Price changes, however, will be entirely due to the unanticipated component
of the government announcement and other new information obtained that day.
This can be seen directly by subtracting (4) from (9) to obtain
III. Evaluating the Social Returns to Government Prediction
To this point, we have shown how government forecasts are translated
into price movements as the market extracts from these forecasts what it
perceives to be new information about the upcoming harvest's size. We now
suggest how our model can be extended to quantify the social value or "use
fulness" of government announcements. In our framework, a government
announcement at t+1 will be assumed to improve market efficiency and, thus,
be socially valuable, if this announcement moves the market closer to the
equilibrium price that would prevail if S were known with certainty.
Let denote the equilibrium price at t+1 if S^^ were known with
certainty, i.e., the supply-side certainty price. If the only uncertainty
in the market comes from the demand side, then S^ , = S and (4) implies
t+1 H
that the price on day t+1 would be
3^^ V 3 "t+r
In the absence of a government announcement, the deviation between
and the actual price will be, according to (4) and (11),
Vt.i - ^.1 = -1
The lower the variance of P„ - P.^, , the lower are the efficiency losses
H, t+1 t+i
due to suboptimal inventory or production decisions resulting from market
prices that do not reflect true supply conditions. The price variance
implied by (12) is
= Er(P -P . (13)t+1 H,t+1, t+r ^ p2 t+1
With government announcements, P„ will be unaffected but P.is given
ti^t+i C+1
rs'
by > according to (9), and so the deviation of actual price from the
"supply-side certainty" price will be
The corresponding price variance around P„ . ., is given by
H, t+ i
= E[(P - p )^] =— ^ (15)t+1 ^^^^H,t+1 t+r ^ .2 ^t+1 ^ ^
P
We have shown earlier that since rational agents will only use government
announcements to reduce their harvest forecast error variances, it must be
that S. ^^+1* then follows from (13) and (15) that ^t+t'
equality holding if, and only if, a= 0. In other words, the average dis
persion of actual price about the supply-side certainty price cannot be
increased by erroneous government forecasts or estimates of its size
regardless of how bad these forecasts tend to be. So long as these fore-
10
casts tend to convey any new and useful information, they will reduce this
6/
price variance.—
Comparing to gives us some leverage in evaluating the value
of government announcements which we will proceed to exploit further. Let
w^ be the social welfare gained per unit reduction in the variance of the
market price on day t from the supply-side certainty price that would pre
vail at t, P . Then the social welfare gain from a government announce-' H,t
ment on day t+1, ' will be
V. •wl. - Ci'- - c>
\rtiich can be written in terms of the underlying parameters as
Since the costs to holding erroneous (ex-post) inventories are greater the
longer the inventory is mistakenly held, we assume that the per unit benefit
to reducing deviations of around P^^ will be larger the greater is H-t,
8 /
i.e., we assume that - w^ < 0
In general it will be difficult to assign specific values to the w '^s.
As a consequence, it will be difficult to do the type of cost-benefit analy
sis that is required to determine if government information collection and
dissemination is cost effective. We can, however, use (17) for other useful
purposes such as suggesting the types of markets in which the returns to
government information collection will be the largest.
For example, our model implies that, ceterus parabus, government infor
mation will be more valuable the more inelastic the demand for the good is.
To see this, we differentiate with respect to 3 to obtain
11
M '-M
3W -2(V - V ) • w^ >1^ <0 (18)
ae g3
since £_ ^^+1* ^ increases, the elasticity of demand for the com
modity increases. Thus, as the demand curve flattens, the return from the
government's provision of information is reduced. This makes sense since,
if the demand curve is perfectly elastic, then there will be no adverse
effects on price because of erroneous supply forecasts.
Thus far, we have concentrated on utilizing our framework to derive
several intuitive results. While these results are not surprising or unique
to this study, they do illustrate that this simple model yields predictions
that are consistent with the prevailing economic wisdom. Next, we turn to
using the model to derive more subtle results.
IV. Some Theoretical Extensions
In this section, we utilize the theoretical framework outlined above to
reveal the circumstances in which government forecasts will be most valu
able. We consider factors such as the size of the market, the correlation
between government and private information, the volatility of agricultural
markets, and the timing and frequency of government forecasts. While we
could potentially address other related issues, this list will illustrate
the value of the theoretical framework in deriving answers to policy ques
tions concerning the provision of government information^
Market Size, Market Information the Value of Government Information
We can make two points regarding the relationship between the value of
government information dissemination to a commodity market and the volume of
trade in the market. First, it must be true that the social value of infor-
12
mation varies directly with the size of the market. Second, the fact that
more private information tends to be available in larger markets than in
smaller markets does not imply that the government's information collection
efforts have a smaller payoff to larger markets. The first point follows
from the observation that deviations about the supply-side certainty price
will tend to result in larger, and therefore costlier, market-wide inventory
errors in larger markets than in smaller markets. Thus the per-unit value
of reducing the deviation around the supply-side certainty price, w^, will
9/
be the largest in the largest markets.—
With regard to our second point, if information is more valuable to a
large market, then we would expect to observe more private information col
lection in larger markets than in smaller markets. However, this does not
imply that the government should allocate its resources more heavily to
collecting information that would be more relevant to smaller markets. In
the first place, as we have shown earlier, so long as the government's
information set is not identical to the market's, the government's informa
tion will be valuable. Even if the government's announcements supply only a
small amount of new information to a large market, the fact that the cost of
the absence of that information is spread so heavily may make it more valu
able than a lot of new information would be to a much smaller (and otherwise
less informed) market.
Government Forecast Error Variance and the Value of Government Information
We now explore how the value of improving government forecasts varies
with the government's forecast error variance. As is showi above, as
government forecasts improve, the market will rely more heavily on them
(i.e., ct will increase) and the market's revised-forecast error variance
13
(V ) will fall. As the market's forecasts improve, the welfare loss due to
forecast errors will drop. However, the welfare gain from a unit reduction
in the government's forecast error will depend nonlinearly on the existing
level of forecast error variance.
To formalize this argument, notice from (16) that the welfare gain from
a government announcement on day t varies inversely with 5^. ^ in turn,
depends upon the variance of the government's forecast errors through (7)
and (8). For simplicity assume that the e '^s and e '^s are drawn from
2 2 2 2.stationary distributions so that ^ ;i^ ~ ^ i ~ ^ ~
2
H." Then the value of ot depends upon 0 according to
(y
2
a= (H - t - 1) (19)
0 + cr
G M
and the corresponding value of ^ is given by
^ = (1 - a)^(H - t - l)c^ + a^(H - t - Da^. (20)
From (19) and (20) it follows that
'-M 4
at a
:^ = 2(H - t - 1) —„ r. ^ > 0 (21)
and
.2,-^
3 V 2<J [a - 3a J
(H - t - 1) . (22)
2 ^3
(21) confirms our previous conjecture that improvements in government fore
casts must reduce the market's forecast errors monotonically. However, the
second derivatie indicates that the relationship between the market's fore-
14
cast error variance and the variance of the government s forecast revision
has a sigmoid shape as illustrated in Figure 1. In particular, for a given
value of ^ rises at an increasing rate as increases until o^equals
Thereafter, rises at a decreasing rate. The limit of ^as
approaches infinity is V^, the market's forecast error variance in the
absence of any government information collection. The implication is that
at very high or very low values of there is little gain to marginal
. ^ 10/
improvements in government forecasts.—
Volatile Markets and the Value of Government Information
Since the volatility of commodity prices is tied directly to market
forecast error variances [according to (13)], we can characterize a volatile
2 2 • _
commodity market as one which has high values of qj •••»
taining the stationarity assumption made in the previous section, a high
I
value of a . Thus, we can consider within our framework how the market s
M
reliance on government announcements varies with the market's volatility.
Formally, we want to deduce the relationship between a and a^. From (19) we
find that
20^
-If = (H - t - 1) • ° , >0 (23)
dO ( 2. Z
and, therefore, the more volatile the market the more reliance the market
will place on a given government forecast.
Notice also that the partial derivative of 3a/with respect to a^is ^
positive. This leaves open the possibility that noisy government forecasts
in unstable period's are valued more highly than more precise government
15
forecasts are in stable periods. This point is illustrated in Figure 2. If
a rises from a to a , a will increase for any given value of say
M ^2
a . In fact, a will not fall even if o rises, provided tht does notGi
exceed o_ .
The Timing and Frequency of Government Announcements
From (19) it is obvious that as t-1 approaches H, a approaches zero.
This simply says that as the market's own information set becomes complete,
the government's forecast becomes uninformative. This result leads to the
suspicion that earlier announcements are more valuable than later announce
ments. We can confirm this suspicion by using the social welfare formula
tion outlined above. We can easily establish that the welfare gains from an
announcement on day t will tend to be larger than those from an announcement
on day t+l, even though the later announcement will tend to be the more
accurate of the two. Recall that is the variance of the price level on
day t when there is no government announcement and is the variance of
that price following a government announcement on that day. The expected
welfare gain from a government announcement on day t that incorporates all
of the information available to the government at that point, will be
P
which we assumed earlier to be equal to ~ where is a weight
that falls monotonically with t. Itewriting W^ in terms of the variance of
the market's harvest forecast errors before and after the announcement, we
get
where B is the slope of the market demand curve. Then, using (17),
16
1 .M .':M
+w^(a(2-a)a^^ - ot^a^)}. (25)
It is straightforward to show that this difference is positive.—^ Thus,
the longer the government waits to release information, the shorter the
period of time the market will have to capture the benefits of that informa
tion and the longer it will bear the costs of the absence of that informa
tion. This analysis implies that frequent government forecasts are move
valuable than infrequent, late forecasts, even if these late forecasts are
more accurate. At one extreme, if the government waits until day H to make
its announcement, the market has already determined the actual harvest value
Sr snd the value of the announcement to the market will be zero. That is,
on day H, ~0>^ ~® other extreme, the
government would continuously distribute the information it collects that is
relevant to which, if the market can process information as well as the
Ggovernment, amounts to announcing e. on day i for i = 0, H-1. This
H
would clearly be the way to maximize 1 W .
t=0 ^
Government Forecasts and the Optimal Extraction of Market Information
Earlier results show unambiguously that lower government forecast vari
ance increases the value of government announcements. We also know that
under some circumstances, government duplication of market information
collection activities can increase the value of government announcements.
There is another way that the government can use market sector information
to improve government forecasts. Ironically, this suggestion would be
extremely inexpensive to implement. It simply involves using movements in
17
market prices to estimate changes in market information using well-known
signal-extraction methods.
We noted earlier that price movements between day t and day t+1, inde
pendent of government announcements, take the form " ^t ~
. Thus, if we can estimate 3, we have —Pj.) =
~ remains to extract the supply information from
the right-hand-side, where ~ demand-side shock. If the
sequences- "t+1 ~"t constant finite variances 0^ and a^,
M
then it is straghtforward to show that the best linear estimate of
conditioned on ~ Pj.) i-s
a"
= - M ' , • Vl -
(0 + a )
e u
Thus, the government could approximate the changes in market informa
tion in periods 0 through t and incorporate this information in the govern
ment announcement in period t+1. If stable estimates of 3, 0^ and 0^ can be
derived, and if is not infinite, the government forecast variance taking
into account estimated market information must be less than the forecast
based on government information alone.
Correlated Market and Government Forecast Errors
To this point we have assumed that the government's daily forecast
revisions are statistically independent of the market's revisions, i.e.,
E
if, for example, the major source of forecast revisions by both groups is
weather information. In such a case we would expect the forecast revisions
1 M
gVl
r M M-I, r G Gi . .
•^0' •••» '•^0' •••» ^~ Such a restriction would be implausible
18
of the two groups to be contemporaneously (and positively) correlated. It
is not hard to extend our framework in this direction as we show in this
section of the paper.
As before, we let ^ denote the market's (harvest) forecast error vari
ance after it has accounted for a government forecast made on day t. Then,
if we let p. denote the correlation between e?? and e? and rule out intertem-
1 11
poral correlation between the e '^s and e '^s we obtairt^^
H H H
^ = (a-l)^ \ 2 - 2a(ct-l) .• (27)
^ t+:
I y a_ . a~ I p. .
.1 M,i ^ t'l
which, assuming stationarity, can be written
^ = (H-t) {(o-D^c^ + - 2a( ct-l) p(^a^}. (28)
. . . . 13/
To minimize , the appropriate value of a can be shown to be—
^ . (29)
"m ^ "g -
Clearly, if p = 0, we obtain our previous results. In general, with
nonzero correlation, a is no longer constrained to be between zero and one.
In fact, a can be negative, and it can exceed one in absolute value. We
will comment on the implications of the size of a below.
Allowing for correlation between the market's and govewrnment's fore
cast revisions also enables us to consider the implications of the govern
ment directing its resources to collecting information that is concurrently
being collected by the market. Formally, this duplication of effort amounts
to analyzing the implications of an increase in the value of p on
Depending on how one views this exercise, we can imagine an increase in p as
19
2 2 14/occurring with or without changes in and 0^.— For our present purposes
we
'"'M 2 2will analyze the effect on ^ of an increase in pwith 0^ and held
fixed. From (28) and (29) it follows that
IS/
= -2(H - t)ci(a - l)a (30)
dp M G
This derivative implies that an increase in the correlation between the
market's and government's forecast revisions (with their respective vari
ances held fixed) will lower (raise) the market's forecast error variance
following a government announcement if and only if a(ct-l) is positive
(negative).
To understand the intuition behind the case where increasing the dupli
cation of effort can reduce V^, notice that d^/dp <0 implies that a<0.
2
In order for'a to be negative, it follows from (29) that < pa^Og. This
means that the covariance between the market's and government's revisions
M G(e and e , respectively) is positive and greater than the variance of the
market's revisions. Since the market's forecast of the harvest size (S )
n
• / \ ^G •following a government forecast on day t j.s (l-a)S^ + oS^ it follows that
"G . "G
a(S - S ) is the change in the market's forecast in response to S . When a
is negative this means that the market will lower (raise) its own forecast
when the government's forecast is unexpectedly high (low). This is because
2
the circimistances that generate a negative a, i.e., cr < with p > 0,
M M Cj
leads the market to use the government's forecast as a signal of the direc
tion of its own forecast errors An unexpectedly high government forecast is
interpreted as meaning that the market's original forecast was too high and
20
consequently the market revises its forecast downward. As p increases, this
perception by the market is more likely to be correct and its response a
proper one. As a result, will fall. Notice that this result implies
that a rational market may respond to an unexpectedly large government crop
forecast by raising the commodity price.
In the case where p = 0 we showed earlier that a reduction in the vari
ance of the government's forecast revisions unambiguously reduces the
market's forecast error variance following a government announcement. That
is. 3^. /3a_ >0. If p is not restricted to be zero, then we can no longer
t G-
claim that a decrease in government forecast error variance will always
reduce the market's forecast error variance. The general expression for
3^/3(Jgis
9 1ft/
-— = 2a a - 2a((t-l)pa .— (31)
da G M
Cj
The first term is unambiguously positive and the second term is positive
when 0 < a < 1 and P >_ 0. However, it is theoretically possible to generate
cases in which the second term is negative and larger in absolute value than
the first. Whether such cases actually exist is a subject for further
empirical study.
In summary, our framework can provide valuable information regarding
the effects of a government announcement regardless of the covariance
between {e^, ..., and ••••> • However, if these two random vec-
U rl U H
tors are not independent of one another, the conclusions that one would draw
from our framework will depend upon the restrictions that are imposed on the
21
covariance matrix. What, if any restrictions are appropriate is by neces
sity a matter of empirical study of individual markets. Such empirical
studies would be a natural extension of our theoretical framework.
IV. Implications for Empirical Studies of Government Forecasts
As we suggested above, using our model for cost-benefit analysis is
extremely difficult since w^ is difficult to measure. We can, however, use
the results above to guide an empirical study of whether a given government
forecast has value. Recall that a will be nonzero if the government fore
cast reduces market forecast error variance. It is thus clear that a
regression of the form (10) can be used to establish if a is nonzero.
H ^ G
Notice that ^ (s. - e.) represents the unanticipated portion of the
t+2 ^ ^
government's announcement (or equivalently, the unanticipated revision from
previous government forecast). ^t+1 "t error terms with
zero mean. We can thus rewrite (10) as
Vi - ^ ^
The estimated coefficient on the unanticipated portion of the announce^
ment, g", will be insignificant if a is zero (meaning the market ignores the
government announcement) or if 3 approaches infinity (meaning the demand
curve is perfectly elastic). Thus, an insignificant coefficient on is
evidence that a given government announcement has no value.
It is interesting to note that in the previous papers which look at
market responses to government crop forecasts, the measure of the unantici
pated government announcement is taken to be the entire difference between
the current and the previous government announcements, not just the unanti-
22
cipated update from the previous announcement.-^^ It is easy to show that
18 /use of the entire update will bias the estimate of a toward zero.—
Equations such as (27) can be applied to different commodity markets at
the same time and to the same commodity market at various times in the crop
year. A comparison of the estimated values of a across equations should
reveal which announcements are most important to the marketplace and which
could be curtailed with the smallest market inefficiency.
VI. Summary
In this paper, we have formulated a model which can serve as a useful
basis to address a wide range of issues that pertain to the government sec
tor's role as a provider of information to agricultural (and other) futures
markets. The model is one in which private agents trade claims on a daily
basis to shares of the stock of a good whose size will not become known
until some (known) future date. The market's daily clearing price depends
upon the trader's predictions about the size of the stock as well as other
(unspecified) factors. Occasionally the government releases information it
has collected about the likely size of the stock. The market's response to
the government's announcement depends upon the extent to which the announce
ment reveals new information to the market. Thus, while anticipated govern
ment announcements are reflected in the market's price levels, only the
unanticipated components of such announcements generate price changes. In
other words, our theory is consistent with the Efficient Markets
Hypothesis.
Among the many conclusions that we can derive from the thoery are the
following:
1. Unless the government's forecasts of the stock's size,are so noisy
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that they contain no relevant information, they will tend to drive the mar
ket price toward the price that would prevail in the absence of stock uncer
tainty.
2. Government information is more valuable (from a social point of
view) the more inelastic is the commodity demand curve.
3. Because of the widespread returns to the provision of information
in large markets, it may be optimal for the government to direct more of its
information collection resources toward such markets, even though these
markets are likely to already be collecting information on their own.
4. Noisier government forecasts during unstable periods may be more
valuable to the market than more accurate forecasts are during more stable
periods. Similarly, forecasts early in the year will be more valuable than
later forecasts, even if the latter are more accurate.
5. The more often the government releases its forecasts to the market
the better, even if less frequent forecasts would mean more accurate fore
casts .
6. Movements in the futures market price contain useful information
that the government could partially extract to improve its forecasts.
7. If, prior to a government announcement, the market and government
forecast revisions are correlated, then the duplication of information
collection by the market and the government can be beneficial or harmful to
the market. The answer will depend upon the nature of the covariance matrix
of the market's and government's forecast errors. In addition, we show that
under certain conditions, an unexpectedly high government crop forecast can
actually cause the futures market price to rise in response.
We conclude our analysis with suggestions regarding how data on futures
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market prices and government announcements can be used to measure the impact
of these announcments. As part of this discussion we explain why simply
regressing price changes on- the (value of the) announcement itself will tend
to underestimte the announcement's impact on the market. This is because of
the difference in the effects of the anticipated and unanticipated compo
nents of the announcement.
V-
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Figure 1: The variance in the market's revised forecast errors given
announced government forecasts with standard error Oq and the
market's pre-announcement forecast standard error o^.
Figure 2;
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The relationship between the optitnal market weight on government
forecasts, a, and the standard error of government forecasts,
given the markets's pre-announcement forecast standard errors
• ft* K. GL.
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Notes
—^For example, in January, 1983, conflicting crop production and inven
tory reports were blamed for a period of wildly fluctuating corn and soybean
prices. This criticism resurfaced following a large upward adjustment in
the USDA estimates of the 1983 soybean harvest was released in September,
1984.
—^The following analysis is unchanged if we allow a nonzero determinis
tic component in u^ to account for factors such as basis risk or carrying
costs .
—^The arrival of information to the government and the market will not
generally be the same. The market, for example, may have a comparative
advantage in obtaining information on current and future inventory plans,
food processing plans, and farm input sales. On the otherhand, the govern
ment, may have a comparative advantage in collecting and processing informa
tion on planting conditions and crop conditions.
—^Looking at equation (4), it is clear that the government cannot
deduce the ^ 's exactly from observed price movements only because of the
unobservable demand shocks which also contribute to price movements. At the
end of Section III we will return to this issue and suggest a procedure that
the government can use to improve their forecasts by estimating the e^'s
from observed price movements.
—^In Section IV we will consider the implications of relaxing this
assumption.
—^This suggests that, in principle, one can empirically test the joint
hypothesis that the market is rational and that government forecasts are
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informative since price variations around the true harvest price (P^) should
fall after a government announcement is these hypotheses are true.
—'•This follows from (16) and our earlier results that
v" = ! .
and
^ = (<^1)' I i ^ i-
t+1 t+2 t+2
—^Inefficient inventory holdings are the source of welfare losses from
noisy information in the Hayami, Peterson and Bradford and Kelejian papers
as well.
—Let N denote the average sales volume in the market. We are assuming
the 3w^/3N > 0 and, therefore, 3W^/N > 0.
—^This suggests that in empirically assessing the social welfare of a
unit reduction in government forecast error variance, one must estimate both
the market's and the government's forecast error variances. Because
previous studies (e.g., Hayami and Peterson, Bradford and Kelejian (1978))
have assumed that all information is obtained from a public information
agency, social returns to more accurate information only involve measures of
a^. Their theoretical results that unit reduction in the error variance o
G
publicly provided information yield linear or nearly linear increases in
social welfare are a consequence of this restriction on the source of
information to the market.
—^Notice, from (16), (17) and our stationarity assumptions, that
s 2 2 2 1 >a(2-a)o„ - a Og = „ _ ^ ^ J.
Thus (25) can be rewritten as
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1 . , 1, M nM
t ^ H- t - - ^.1-
P :
Since we are assuming thaC 0 and it follows that the term in
brackets is strictly positive. The difference, ~^+1* nega
tive since ^+1 ' the market's forecast error variance in the absence of a
government announcement cannot be less than its forecast error variance
after it has accounted for the government announcement
-^^Equation (27) follows directly from the definition of ^ as
E
^ _ ,2[S^ — S„1 and equation (6).
t n
—^This result is found by differentiating ^ with respect to a and
setting that derivative equal to zero.
-^^In other words, depending on the underlying cause of the increase in
p, that increase can be accompanied by one of many possible combinations of
2 2
changes in a and a . If, for example, p increases because the market has
M G
gained access to data previously available only to the government, we would
2 . 2expect the increase in p to occur along with a decrease in 0^ while
remains unchanged.
—^With <5 and 0 being held fixed, (28) and (29) imply that
la M
= f(a(p), p) . Therefore, d^/dp= (8f/8a) • Oa/3p) + Since
t t dp
9f/ 9a = 3^/ aa and a has been constructed so that 3^/3a= 0, it follows
that dV^/dp = 3f/3p.
-^^With pand being held fixed, we can proceed to calculate d'^ /do^
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in the same manner we used to derive dV^/dp (see footnote 15). That is,
since by construction 9^/3a= 0, dV^/do^ = ^ ^ held
fixed.
—^For examples, see Choi (1982), Miller (1979), and Hoffman (1982).
—^Let be the anticipated revision in the government's forecast so
that , equals the total update in the government's forecast from
t+1 C+1 ^ '
the previous government forecast. The analysis above suggests that
will have no effect on price movements on day t+1. Thus, if .the entire
update is used so that -P^. is regressed onconstrain
the coefficient on the unanticipated announcement to equal the coefficient
on the anticipated announcement, i.e. zero. Thus, using the entire govern
ment .announcement update in the regression biases the analysis toward rejec
tion of the value of government forecasts.
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